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But I would speak to the Almighty,
And I desire to argue my case with God
(Job, 13, 3)

My favorite moment in all of literature occurs in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov.
Ivan Karamazov, dreaming or delirious, is arguing with the Devil. The Devil, however, is quite
coherent, even eloquent. At one point, in response to an accusation, the Devil responds, “God
forbid I should I philosophize!” (Dostoevsky 1970, p. 772. In Constance Garnett’s and Robert
McDuff’s translations, it comes out closer to, “God save me [from philosophizing].”) There’s
something about the image of the Devil appealing to God to save him from philosophizing that I
find hilarious. And maybe a bit troublesome. But certainly deeply intriguing.
The role of the Devil in Judeo-Christian theologies is problematic. A central strand,
however, is determined by Satan’s role as “the Adversary.” One thing the Adversary does is
argue with God— and not just in the role of Devil’s Advocate in the judgment of souls, but in the
genuine give-and-take of rational debate. How can you argue with God? Surely, there could be
no unconsidered counterconsiderations, no unanticipated objections, no dubious premises among
the divine ideas, or, God forbid, any fallacies in the reasoning of a Being with all Perfections. So
what could be the point of arguing when the outcome is foreordained? Why argue when you
know going into it that it cannot possibly end with a “See? I was right and you were wrong”? If
you find yourself arguing with omniscience, you must be wrong!
And yet the Bible includes many examples of arguing with God. Besides the Adversary, for
whom arguing is part of the job description, many of the characters with whom God speaks
argue: Abraham, Moses, Job, Elijah, Jeremiah, and David all argue with God, not to mention
Jacob who wrestles with God physically and not just verbally. Moreover, subsequent literature
also provides us with coherent, even deeply meaningful, examples. These range from the
familiar schmoozing and bargaining of Sholom Aleichem’s Tevye the Dairyman to the profound
exchanges Dostoyevsky crafted between Ivan Karamazov and the Grand Inquisitor, both in the
19th century, and beyond them, in our own time, to the dark, adversarial, and personal challenges
of Peter Shaffer’s Antonio Salieri in Amadeus and Elie Weisel’s post-Holocaust moral protests to
God. I would like to juxtapose a couple of these in order to construct what I hope is a helpful
matrix for thinking not so much about God, but about arguments. The extreme and distorted
case of arguing with God sheds light, by contrast, on other sorts of unwinnable arguments,
including, I believe, many philosophical arguments.
I. Moses.
The first case I want to consider, and the easiest to analyze, involves Moses. He argued with
God when he offered reasons why he should not be the one chosen to lead the people out of
Egypt — the Israelites will not believe you sent me, Pharaoh will not listen to me, I am not
eloquent (Exodus 3,10-4,17). It does not take foreknowledge to expect that each reason Moses
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could offer would be met with a cogent reply. The analysis is straightforward: one party offers a
thesis (actually, a command, but assertions are not the only speech acts for which we can argue);
an objection is raised by the second party and it is countered by the first; a second objection is
raised, and it too is countered; a third objection meets the same fate; and finally there is
acquiescence. One side in the argument is overmatched. God has the stronger argument. It
cannot be defeated by any of Moses’ objections. And God is the better arguer insofar as God can
answer every objection to Moses’ satisfaction. The result follows accordingly. Perhaps the
lesson to be learned is that there is just no arguing with God.
In one sense, this is right: it is impossible to argue with God. There are, however, several
senses available. Obviously there has to be some sense in which it is possible, if we grant that
Moses did it and that there are other coherent stories to be told using this theme. The first sense
that suggests itself is that what is impossible is winning an argument with God. (There is a
counterexample to this at Exodus 32, 11-14. Moses apparently wins an argument with God
insofar as God is persuaded not to destroy the Israelites who fashioned the Golden Calf.) But
isn’t that, by definition, each disputant’s goal? That would make the act of arguing with God
pointless. Or is the impossibility of arguing with God predicated on the impossibility of
engaging God in argument? While we may argue with the absent and the dead, they do not
argue back. They engage us; we do not engage them. A Transcendent God is altogether
unreachable. Or does the impossibility have something to do with God’s nature? You cannot
argue with the weather, no matter how immanent a part of our lives it may be.
As Trudy Govier perceptively notes, the act of arguing involves an implicit
acknowledgement of the possibility of disagreement about the question at hand. Writing on the
genuine engagement that characterizes the sort of rational exchanges we hope for, she writes,
The practice of argument implies a recognition that there may be legitimate doubts about
some of our beliefs and that other persons, reasonable persons with whom we stand in a
relationship in virtue of the fact that we are speaking to them or writing for them, and they
are listening to us or reading our work, can differ from us in their beliefs, judgments, values
and opinions. (Govier 1999a, p. 47. The emphasis is in the original text)

That is, the act of engaging in argument puts the disputants into a personal relationship of
approximate parity. There are three parts to this: the personhood of argument-mates, a personal
relationship between them, and the parity of the disputants. All of these can be called into
question when one of the arguers is God.
Some preliminary comments on argument analysis are needed. The word “argument” can
refer to either the content of what someone presents or else to the communicative exchange, the
episode in discourse. In the burgeoning literature of argumentation theory, these are typically
distinguished as argument-1 and argument-2. (The distinction between argument-1 vs.
argument-2 was originally made in O’Keefe 1977, pp. 121-128). The paradigm case of an
argument in the first sense is a mathematical proof: given premises, explicit inferences, and a
final conclusion. It is almost as if arguers were an optional extra. The extreme case of the
second might be a longstanding feud over a long-forgotten slight: all conflict without substance
or reasons. The arguments in which we find ourselves typically involve elements of both: we
argue both about something and with someone.
Govier’s point calls attention to the arguers, not just the arguments they present. The act of
arguing presupposes that there is another person with whom we have a relationship that includes
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the possibility of rational disagreement. We often provide that second voice to ourselves, so we
can be, or fill the role of, that other person in our own arguments. Can God be that person?
Part of what is funny about arguing with God is the idea of God as an arguer. There is a
tension between the more abstract, deistic concept of God developed in the universities and
academies of the Ancient Greek and Medieval Latin philosophical traditions, and the more
personal, theistic concept of God that was earlier presented by the Judaeo-Christian religious
tradition. Tevye, rooted in one tradition, could argue with God, but he could also confide in God,
negotiate with God, and even joke around with God. Imagine trying to schmooze with Spinoza’s
Substance-Itself, the epitome of the other tradition! Arguing with God presupposes that God is a
person. Arguments are not abstract sets of propositions juxtaposed in logical space; they are
instantiated in the complex relations between persons. (This has become a well-accepted tenet of
argumentation theory, but it has not always been so, and its significance is debated. Gilbert
1997, esp. chapter 3, champions the idea that the social dimensions to argument must be
prominent in argumentation theory.) Propositions do not argue any more than rocks or trees do.
If we find an argument in the impersonal world, it is one more case of how we can find the
strange in the ordinary, just as we can see a bicycle seat or a urinal as a work of art, or read a
biography as a novel. (Perloff 1996, Chapter 2, discusses finding the strange in the ordinary in
relation to Wittgenstein’s discussion in the Investigations of “ordinary“ language; Danto 1983
brings the notion of reading-as into clear focus. The notion of reading something as an
argument is not explicitly addressed, but perhaps it should be.) For our part, we can argue at the
world, but we cannot really argue with it.
Arguers are persons, then. And Moses’ God was indeed a personal God. The relationship
that the Ancient Israelites had with God was based on a Covenant, and a covenant presupposes
that same kind of personal relationship. We cannot enter into a Covenant with Spinoza’s
impersonal God any more than we can argue with it. Interestingly, the Covenantal relationship is
missing from, or altered in, the New Testament, and so, for the most part, is arguing with God.
(If Jesus’ cry on the cross, “Why hast thou forsaken me?” is read as an argument, then it is a
notable exception. Jesus, of course, was Jewish.)
There is still something very odd about a mere human arguing with even a personal God that
does not apply to, say, arguments that Gods might have among themselves. The disparity seems
too great. But it is not only the difference between the disputants that generates the problem
because there is no comparable problem in arguing with Zeus or Odin. The concept of an OmniGod that emerged in the Judaeo-Christian traditions is not one among many, and could not be. It
is arguing with this God that seems pointless. More specifically, what is absurd about arguing
with a personal but perfect God is not the idea of God giving reasons to humans, nor even the
notion of God as judge hearing reasons from humans, but the image of humans offering reasons
to God. What could we hope to accomplish?
Once we stop thinking of arguments as ordered sets of propositions, as a form whose ideal is
realized in proof, then there is room for other, more helpful, models. It is absurd to argue with
God, if that means setting forth a deductively connected chain of theses beginning from
putatively true ones in order to establish the truth of another. Whatever epistemic value there
might be in such an exercise for us, it would surely have none here. It would be pointless to
present God with an argument of the first type, a logical proof. Are there any serious and
interesting examples of someone trying to demonstrate something to God? (Ayer 1952, pp. 85-
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86, citing Hans Hahn, offers the trope of a God altogether bored with any deductive system.
There are some fantasies that have reversed the image: Deities spending (post-Gödelian!)
eternity exploring the infinite realms of mathematics.) Arguments are not, in general, proofs, so
argument analysis has to be more than the analysis of logical implication. The goals of
argumentation cannot be assumed to be the same as those of proofs.
In that case, the act of arguing with God need not require that God is a person approximately
like us. Moses does seem to have labored under that assumption, however. He had space to
argue with God in part because absolute omniscience, epistemic infallibility, was not the
defining–or even an especially prominent -- characteristic of the God of the books of Genesis
and Exodus. That perfection was added (or, if you prefer, recognized) later. Still, more needs to
be said because neither Moses, nor Abraham, nor Job, nor Jeremiah, nor any of the other arguers
with God was under any delusions about telling God something new. God was at least
sufficiently-knowing to be all-knowing for all practical purposes within the contexts of these
arguments. But even absolute omniscience need not exclude argument. Elie Weisel’s arguments
with God are a counterexample because he presumes omniscience and still argues. Arguing is an
interaction between persons that is part of the complex nexus of social relations. There is no
reason to suppose that argumentation serves only logical and epistemological purposes, to the
exclusion of political, ethical, religious, of other ends.
There is no arguing with God, if the purpose is to give God new knowledge. Job makes just
this point about God’s role as judge: “Will any teach God knowledge?” (Job, 21, 22.) That still
leaves actions and attitudes as arguable points. Like absolute omniscience, absolute omnibenevolence, or moral infallibility, was not a prominent characteristic of God as portrayed in the
Books of Moses. As Anson Laytner (1990) argues, when God has been taken to task in the
literary and theological traditions, it has been over values and actions, not facts. Abraham’s
argument on behalf of Sodom and Gomorrah, for example, was about justice, not about exactly
how many blameless citizens actually lived in those cities. And Moses’ successful argument
with God during the incident with the Golden Calf was also about actions, not about the truth of
certain propositions.
II. Job
Job’s argument with God (, especially chapters 6-7. 9-10. 12-14, and 26-31, and God’s
response in chapters 38-41) is more notorious and more problematic. There are actually three
different sorts of arguments in the Book of Job. First, there is God’s argument with the
Adversary, or Satan. That leads to their wager, and then to Job’s travails. It is an argument
whose disputants have comparable stature. Second, there are the arguments that Job has with his
friends, defending himself against charges that he must suffer quietly under these burdens, that
he must have sinned, or that he must not have been pious enough. These arguments, too, are
between equals, but they foreshadow the final argument, Job’s argument directly with God, in
which Job rightly claims that he has been treated wrongly.
Job’s argument follows what has been called the “law-court pattern” of argumentative
prayers, a pattern established earlier in the Bible (See Laytner 1990, esp. pp. xiii-xxii and chapter
1). A complaint is brought before the judge, in this case God, against a defendant, in this case
also God. The facts of the case are stated. Reasons are given substantiating the complaint,
including such things as God’s promises, the Covenant with Israel, and Job’s “blameless and
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upright” life--to use God’s own words from the argument with Satan. Finally, a petition for
redress is submitted for judgment and action. God’s response in this case was manifestly
inadequate from a juridical standpoint, and perhaps theologically as well. Moreover, it was also
inadequate as an argument--logically, rhetorically, and dialectically. God pulls rank. The
response, in essence, is “Who are you to argue with the great and powerful Yahweh?”-- an
answer that is no better than “Who are you to argue with the great and powerful Oz?” when
delivered by a displaced charlatan from Kansas. This might be read as an appeal to force of,
well, Biblical proportions, but I think it is something else. It is more of a failure to engage in
argument in the first place rather than a fallacy within an argument that is underway.
The distinction between failing to engage in an argument and committing a fallacy within in
an argument is important. Job was no more successful in arguing with God than Moses was, but
for different reasons. Job tried to argue with God, but God did not argue back. God’s response
responded to Job, the arguer; it did not respond to Job’s argument. It failed to engage rather than
missed the point. That is, God’s response was inadequate not because it was a bad argument, but
because it was not an argument. It was a response of a different sort, more like walking away
from an argument or filibustering to prevent debate than like arguing or debating illogically. The
failure to engage in argument is not a fallacy, a logical error per se because if you do not argue,
then you cannot argue poorly. Failing to argue can be an argumentative failing nonetheless.
Arguments, remember, are more than ordered sets of propositions. They are relations between
persons, and so subject to extra-logical conventions and imperatives, including the social and
ethical. In particular, they are relations in discourse, so they are subject to such linguistic
conventions as Grice’s maxims and Peirce’s imperatives of rationality. (Grice 1975 is the locus
classicus for the concept of conversational implicatures.) What is being suggested here is that
the concept be extended to accommodate other speech acts in addition to assertions, and that
argumentation may involve very different sorts of perlocutionary, if not also illocutionary, acts.
In any case, the principle of cooperation should be read as sometimes mandating argument! The
imperatives of rationality would certainly include William James’ “epistemological
commandments” to believe the true and disbelieve the false, but also C. S. Peirce’s “Do not
block the road to inquiry.” To Peirce’s “Thou shalt not” I would add a “Thou shalt,” viz.,
“Argue!” Maybe, then, there’s no arguing with God for altogether different reasons! Sometimes
it might be because we dare not enter into such an argument, but sometimes because God refuses
to argue with us.
A recent contribution to argumentation theory that I find helpful is the concept of a “model
interlocutor” to help evaluate arguments. (The term and concept “model interlocutor” is taken
from A. Blair and R. Johnson 1987.) Model interlocutors have the requisite background
information relative to their communities, raise the right sorts of objections, are open to reason
and appreciate the strength of an argument. Roughly, an argument is a good one if it will
convince a model interlocutor, in parallel to similar references in epistemology and ethics to
ideal observers or perfectly moral agents. The concept of a model interlocutor accommodates
the insights that arguments presuppose arguers, and that arguers are always contextually situated
in communities. It needs to include the insight that there are more argumentative failings than
fallacies in reasoning. A truly model interlocutor would not just accept strong arguments and
resist weak ones, but would also engage in argument when it is called for and refrain from
argument when that is appropriate. Neither obsessive quibblers nor the willfully deaf qualify.
When we need to argue, model interlocutors are there for us. Omniscience notwithstanding, and
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despite those other perfections, God is not a model interlocutor, at least not for Job. Job asks
only two things of God, prior to arguing: “withdraw thy hand far from me, and let not dread of
thee terrify me.” If those conditions for arguing are met, Job continues, “Then call, and I will
answer; or let me speak, and do thou reply” (Job, 13, 21-22). These are eminently reasonable
minimal conditions for interlocutors in rational debate. (See also Job 23, 3-5.) All Job really
wanted was a fair hearing. In the end, (Job 38-41), God does answer Job.
III. Abraham
One other Biblical story, involving Abraham, provides a good counterpoint to the arguments
of Moses and Job. Abraham, back in Genesis set the precedent for arguing with God. Even that
Knight of Infinite Resignation could summon up the gumption to argue with God on occasion.
He tried, for example, to convince God not to destroy the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah in their
entireties (Genesis 18, 23-33). As in Moses’ case, but not Job’s, the argument was unsuccessful
because each objection was success-fully countered. But at least the argument was engaged,
again as for Moses but not Job.
It is, however, not this argument, but another episode that provides the revealing
counterpoint. It is a case of something missing—like the dog that did not bark that allowed
Sherlock Holmes to solve one of his cases (“Silver Blaze”). Abraham argued to save Sodom, but
inexplicably, and prima facie shamefully, he did not argue with God when God commanded him
to sacrifice his own son. This is a disturbing omission: an occasion where Abraham did not
engage in argument but where it was surely called for (Genesis 22). Arguably, the residents of
Sodom did something to deserve their fate; Isaac was innocent. Abraham’s failure to raise
objections against God — a logical sin of omission rather than commission — is no less an
argumentative failure than God’s refusal to respond to the objections raised by Job. The
argumentative counterpart to Grice’s maxim of quantity has been breached, or, on some
readings, flouted.
Why didn’t Abraham argue with God? It cannot be because he would not dare such an
affront. He had already argued for the residents of Sodom. It cannot be because he did not have
the motivation. Isaac was his beloved son. There is a mountain of commentary on the meaning
of this episode, but not much directly on the missing argument. (There is, unsurprisingly, a
Midrash on this, conjecturing that an argument would have been an appropriate response, and
continuing to consider what an appropriate argument for Abraham could be. See Laytner 1990,
p. 48, fn. 22.) To be sure, Isaac was a gift from God, so perhaps there is a proprietary relation
justifying the call for his sacrificial return, but children are not property like sheep or goats.
Perhaps God’s demand could, in the end, be contextually justified because the story makes a
point about human sacrifice, religious rituals, and what was to differentiate Israelite worship of
God from the neighboring tribes. Perhaps it could be justified by appeal to the notion of piety or
obedience or God’s power. Perhaps, for each of these cases, but no opportunity for airing any
possible justification was ever given, and some justification was manifestly necessary.
The point I want to make is that even if Abraham knew all of these possible justifications
beforehand, and so knew beforehand that he was going to lose whatever argument he might
offer, he still should have argued. He had an obligation to argue — a moral obligation, certainly,
but a rational dialectical one as well — precisely because of the personal relationship he had with
God. Their relationship was, among other things, dialogical. Abraham can be faulted here for
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failing to argue, so he too falls short of model interlocutor status. Elie Weisel has suggested that
Abraham and God were engaged in a game of high-stakes chicken, and that Abraham was calling
God’s bluff. In that case, the absence of argument flouted the imperative to argue to challenge
God’s command by implicature rather than directly by argument.
These are, then, all failed examples of arguing with God. Moses’ weak argument was
unsuccessful because it was defeated. Job’s strong argument was unsuccessful because it was
ignored. And the argument Abraham should have pressed was stillborn, and so never had the
chance to succeed or fail. Abraham’s failure differs in that it had nothing to do with losing. The
failure was in not arguing.
But why, exactly? What sense are we to make of the idea that there can be a need for
argument even when it is sure to lose? Could a losing argument still count as successful? No
debate with God can be won, no proofs will surprise or teach God anything, but there are other
reasons to argue. There is reason to go down swinging, rather than just going down.
Just as the model of arguments as mathematical proofs has to be abandoned as too
constricting to accommodate the full richness of dialectical arguments, so too, we have to
abandon the model of arguments as essentially win-lose, adversarial moments in order to
accommodate the full social context and the broadly rational purposes of arguers.
IV. Tevye, Salieri, Weisel
This brings me to the main point, which is not about God or arguing with God, but about
arguments generally and the specific questions of why we argue and how arguments end. There
are many different purposes for arguing and many different ways for arguments to reach
resolution. Winning and losing are not the only outcomes. There are other outcomes, like
negotiation and compromise, disagreement with the promise of continued dialogue, or the
suspension of belief and a commitment to further investigation. If an argument is trying to
justify an action or explain a position, rather than demonstrate a thesis, then imparting
understanding or earning an acknowledgement may be more appropriate goals than persuasion.
There are other resolutions with their own criteria for success, so arguers should try to align their
reasons for arguing with the desired closure. More attention needs to be paid to “exit strategies”
for argument. (Govier 1999b raises the issue of the importance of receiving acknowledgement
as an end of argument and how the recognition of that goal should inform how we argue ) The
impossibility of arguing with God assumes winning is the only successful outcome. (And also,
of course, on particular conceptions of God.) When the circumstances are right, you can indeed
argue with God.
Recall the distinction between arguments-1 and arguments-2. It is typically supposed that to
succeed in the second of these, a dialectical argument with an adversarial element, you need
either the better reasons, i.e., the stronger argument-1, logically, or the better presentation,
rhetorically. With both the stronger reasons and the better presentation, you should win the day.
That does not always happen, however. There is a third element, the audience. Even the most
rhetorically gifted among us, armed with the strongest evidence, most compelling reasons, and
most cogent arguments will not convince a biased jury, hostile observers, or an uninformed or
uncomprehending crowd. Imagine arguing for legalized abortion--before the National Right To
Life Party meetings, or critiquing the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics--for a class
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of kindergartners, or pleading a defendant’s case--in English to a jury of monolingual
francophones. Regardless of its content and regardless of the performance, the English language
defense is not a good argument in that courtroom. Arguments cannot be fully evaluated apart
from their specific contexts. An adequate analytic account of an argument has to include at least
these three factors: the arguer, the argument-1, and the audience. An adequate analytic account
of dialectical arguments may have to consider each factor twice. The presented arguments-1
might dovetail, of course, reducing the analytic task. When that happens, it is all to the good, a
tribute to the arguers, but it is not always so. Similarly, the disputants may themselves be each
other’s audience, but that, too, is not always the case. In political debates, the disputants often
play to very different audiences, and the success of their arguments has to be judged accordingly.
This analytic framework provides a way to answer our questions. Arguers may have all
sorts of motives for entering into arguments. There may, for example, be social agendas in
effect. Arguing is a way of engaging another person, often negatively, but not necessarily.
Arguing can serve a political purpose by challenging someone’s authority, apart from the
purported issue under discussion. An argument can serve epistemological ends as part of an
effort to justify or explain oneself. For some philosophers, arguing seems to serve hedonistic
purposes. The presented arguments also differ greatly, bringing to bear all the concerns that
matter to us: political, ethical, theological, scientific, aesthetic, etc. And, as noted, arguers play to
different audiences. Recall the debates in the Senate last year on censure as a replacement
motion to the articles of impeachment. Democratic senators could argue for a censure motion
knowing they would never have to vote on it, while Republicans could argue for impeachment,
knowing that their votes would be safely ineffective. Who were these arguments for? Not the
other Senators, certainly.
This points to a general criterion for argumentative success, connecting all the resolutions:
an argument is successful when it satisfies its audience. If the audience is an opponent, that
means winning the argument. If the audience is some hypothetical model interlocutor, success
means producing a cogent argument. If the audience is oneself, then that means re-affirming that
one’s decision or conclusion is rational. Deductive validity satisfies just about everyone, but that
is rarely what arguments are about.
Apply these distinctions to arguments with God. Who is the audience in each case? For
Job, the audience is God the Judge, not God the defendant, but it is also we the readers of the
Book of Job. The same is true for the others cases. Abraham has an obligation to argue not just
for himself and on behalf of Isaac, but to us, the readers. We, the audience, are cheated.
Similarly, Job argues in order register his protest, to go on record as objecting to his treatment.
For that purpose, it is more important that his argument is loud and clear, and forceful and
memorably eloquent, than that it persuades God. It needs to speak to us and for us more than it
needs to speak to God and for Job.
Thus, at the end of this argument, we end up where philosophy starts, with Plato, because
Job can be read as more than just the paragon of patience; he can be seen as a paradigm of that
most Socratic of virtues, unquestioning faith… in argument! I believe that that is also the faith
that Elie Weisel brings to his post-Holocaust arguments with God. He questions God and
challenges God, but not as Salieri does, as an adversary. Rather, after the Holocaust, arguing
with God is seen as the only alternative to severing all relations completely. No one expects to
win an argument with God, but that does not make the act of arguing pointless. Faith in
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argument is also the faith that one brings to philosophy. After all, in truth, does any one of us
ever really expect to win — permanently and decisively — any of the sundry philosophical
arguments in which we engage? If that is not altogether beside the point, at least it is not the
whole point of arguing — or of philosophy.
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